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ccording to Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), capital is not an 
economic quantity, but a mode	of	power. Their fundamental thesis could be 
summarized as follows: capital is power quantified in monetary terms. But 
what do we do when we quantify? What is the nature of money in a capitalist society? 
Indeed, what is power? In the following, we try to develop a concept of power as the 
ability of persons to create particular formations against resistance. The kinds of 
formations persons can think of depend on the society they live in, which can be 
identified by what Cornelius Castoriadis called its social imaginary significations 
(SIS). The core SIS of capitalism is rational	mastery operating with computational 
rationality. Computational rationality in turn rests on a particular understanding of 
how signification works: it works through operational symbolism, as theorized by 
Sybille Krämer in analyzing the philosophy of Leibniz. When the concept of the SIS of 
modern rationality was developed in the 1950s and 1960s, bureaucracy was seen as 
the main organizational mode of rational mastery. We argue that there are two modes 
of rational mastery, capitalization and bureaucratization, that interact with each 
other in capitalist society. The paper concludes with deliberations on the future of 
rational mastery and possible ways out. 
1 Power,	Gestaltungsvermögen	
1.1 From	Wealth	to	Vermögen	
In English, of persons who own a variety of assets that have a certain monetary value, 
one says that they have a certain wealth. In English, it is not clear how wealth as such 
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‘wealth’ is Vermögen, sometimes even Kapitalvermögen. You say, Mr. Gates has a 
Vermögen of $100 billion. Now, the word Vermögen is also used more generally to 
denote the ability to do something, the power	to. Indeed, etymologically Vermögen 
belongs to the same group as the German Macht, which is the direct translation of 
‘power’, especially in political contexts. These words trace their etymology to the 
Indo-European root magh, which means ‘ability’ or ‘power’, and from which all kinds 
of related English words, like ‘might’, ‘mechanics’, ‘machine’ and many others, 
including ‘magician’, derive; there is also the closely related root maĝh, which means 
‘fight’ or ‘struggle’ (Köbler 2014). 
So in German, the identity of capital and power is already built into the language—
and the etymologically English equivalent to Kapitalvermögen would be ‘capital 
might’. The reader can get a feeling for the meaning of Vermögen by taking an 
arbitrary report about goings-on in business and replace words like ‘asset’, ‘wealth’ 
and ‘equity’ with ‘might’. The use of the word Vermögen for financial wealth 
apparently seems to have started around 1500 (Grimm and Grimm 2019). This was 
the age of German protocapitalists, most notably Jacob Fugger of Augsburg (b. 1459–
d. 1525), whose byname was ‘the Rich’ and who, at the end of his life, controlled much 
of European silver and copper production, silver being the foundation of the hard 
money of the age and copper a raw material necessary for making then new weapons 
of mass destruction, cannons and guns. Fugger and other rich men were able to turn 
their business success into political influence. For example, Fugger was responsible, 
i.e. paid for, Charles V to become emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1519 
(Häberlein 2012; Steinmetz 2016). In an age that was otherwise still feudalist, this 
new kind of monetized power, Geldvermögen, was reflected in chapbooks, early 
popular printed story books, notably in the well-known Dr.	Faustus, about a magician 
who seeks power through a pact with the devil, but also in the much less known 
Fortunatus, which plays out the possibilities its main character has with a purse that 
contains money each time he opens it (Suchsland 1968). 
1.2 Gestaltungsvermögen	
So now we have Vermögen, financial wealth or might as well as the ability to…. But to 
what? Very generally, we can say that the world changes. Say that at some initial time 
the world is in some inital state. Without action of a certain person, at some later time 
the world would be in some later state. Person here denotes an acting entity such as 
a human being, a group of people or an institution such as a corporation or a state. 
The trajectory of world states from the inital state to the later state may be called the 
course	of	events. Assume the person wants the world to be in a different or alternative 
later state instead. If the person can act in such a way so as to actually achieve that 
alternative state, we can say that the person has the ability, or Vermögen, or might, or 
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power to do so. We may call the action to alter the course of events 
Gestaltungstätigkeit, roughly ‘action to create formations’. Gestalt, or formation 
denotes an identifiable state of affairs. In this context, to form/formation/Gestalten is 
to be understood very generally as a genuine act of creation, not just a change of 
something already existing—this extended meaning may be more natural for the 
German word ‘Gestaltung’ than for the English ‘formation’. 
At this point, I avoid the term ‘creorder’ coined by Nitzan and Bichler (2009), partly 
because I have been unable to find a good translation into German, but also to 
underline that Gestalten or formations need not be fully ordered; they can also be 
messy or chaotic—Gestaltungstätigkeit may create disorder as well as order. 
Since the course of events left on its own tends to a different state than what the acting 
person wants, that person will normally act against resistance. Gestaltungsvermögen, 
or power, is the ability to create formations against resistance. This is a very general 
definition and, when applied to formations in the physical realm, can be translated 
one-to-one into the physical term power	=	work	per	time, work (or energy) being, so 
to say, the quantification of the amount of what there is to do divided by the time over 
which the action is necessary. 
1.3 Gesellschaftliches	Gestaltungsvermögen	
A society consists of more than one person. Let there be two persons, one person and 
another person. Given the initial state of affairs, the one person wishes a particular 
later state of affairs, while the other person would like another later state of affairs. If 
the two intended later states are different, the two persons are in conflict. The two 
persons could negotiate or even cooperate. But if they do not and their goals 
contradict each other, a power struggle ensues. And of course, the two persons are 
not alone. Hence, a person’s social	power, gesellschaftliches	Gestaltungsvermögen, is 
their ability to overcome the combined, but not necessarily coordinated, resistance of 
all other persons with respect to their goals. The goal may be greater or smaller in 
that the intended state of the world may be farther away or closer to the course of 
events. The farther away it is, the more other people are involved or affected; hence 
more resistance is to be expected, and greater power is necessary to overcome it. 
We can now say that capitalization is the quantification of the otherwise only 
qualitative notions of ‘greater’ and ‘smaller’ with respect to what goals can be 
achieved. In an almost fully capitalized world, for example, Bill Gates, with a capital 
might or Vermögen of $100 billion, can realize any project for which facilities costing 
that order of magnitude can be bought, which are of course greater than the facilities 
someone with only $1 income a day can buy. The quantification is necessarily relative, 
since social ability is relative to the social ability of others. 
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If persons find that their goals cannot be reached with the means currently at their 
disposal, i.e. their gesellschaftliches Gestaltungsvermögen, or power, is insufficient, 
they may try to increase their power. That is, they may use their power to increase, 
or accumulate, power. Seeking power may thus become an end in itself. And since 
power is relative, we have relative or differential	accumulation (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009), which turns out to be a generic concept applicable to all power struggles, not 
just to capitalism. Thus, we can define capital (Kapitalvermögen) as the ability to 
create formations such that the formations created increase the ability to create 
formations. 
Once such a self-reflexive use of power has started in a society, all members of that 
society will gradually be drawn into using power to accumulate power lest they lose 
their own Gestaltungsvermögen to those who engage in the power struggle. And once 
self-reflexive power conflicts have started, there is a tendency to turn all of a society’s 
resources into means for those conflicts; hence the tendency, under capitalism, for 
the ‘capitalization of everything’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). 
We note that Gestaltungstätigkeit is neutral with respect to whether the action is 
productive or destructive, an evaluation that may differ depending on the point of 
view of the persons involved. From the point of view of rulers, the destructive 
capabilities of an army under their command are productive with respect to their 
quest for power, while the productive capabilities of an enemy’s factory are 
destructive, because they generate the means—the most obvious being weapons—to 
oppose their goal. 
1.4 Social	Imaginary	Significations	
In the previous section, we defined power as the ability to achieve a goal against the 
resistance of others with competing goals. And capital as the power to increase that 
ability. But what goals can a person in a given society imagine achieving? There are 
two questions here: 
a) What can people imagine to be achievable? 
b) Of what they imagine to be achievable, what do they consider worth achieving? 
The first question denotes the limits, or extent, of their power	 of	 imagination 
(Vorstellungsvermögen), while the second denotes the meaning or signification of 
people’s actions: not everything imaginable is worth doing. I think this is roughly 
what Cornelius Castoriadis (1987, 1997b, 1997a) has in mind when he theorizes that 
each society can be characterized by its SIS: a society’s SIS is a coherent set of what 
that society’s members can imagine and what they think is and is not worth doing. 
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Castoriadis distinguishes two types of SISs and hence societies: autonomous and 
heteronomous. An SIS is always the collective creation of the members of the society 
in which it exists, but in a heteronomous society, people imagine that both the natural 
order, or the physis, and the social order, or the nomos, have been created not by 
themselves, but by some external and unreachable entity, whether God, the 
forefathers or human nature. Indeed, the distinction between physis and nomos does 
not make sense in the context of a heteronomous SIS. Typically, heteronomous SISs 
are closed in the sense that they offer an explanation for whatever happens. This 
closedness in turn makes heteronomous SISs static: they are imagined to be 
unchangeable and eternal. Fundamentalism, the call for a return to an imagined point 
of origin, is thus common in heteronomous SISs. 
In contrast, the members of an autonomous society not only know that they 
themselves are the creators of their imaginary significations, but also take advantage 
of this fact by making conscious changes if they deem them necessary, which breaks 
the closedness of the SIS. The social order is no longer given, but subject to change, 
and only in autonomous societies do we find politics proper. And the possibility of 
consciously changing the social order in turn gives rise to questions of how to go 
about changing things and of the limits of the Gestaltungsvermögen: autonomy is the 
discovery of the distinction between physis and nomos. Science and philosophy 
proper are only possible in an autonomous society. 
Autonomous societies have a strong tendency towards equality and equal 
participation in the Gestaltungstätigkeit because once all aspects of the social order 
are subject to change, there is no longer any higher reason for inequality and non-
participation. The United States, for example, started as a patriarchal slave state but 
eventually abandoned slavery and racial and sexual discrimination as legal 
institutions. 
2 Modern	Rationality	and	Rational	Mastery	
According to Castoriadis (2003c), Western modernity can be characterized by the 
double SIS of rational	mastery and autonomy. 
Rational	mastery	=	rationality	+	mastery is a compositum. I do not think that modern 
rationality as such implies mastery. Mastery when combined with rationality has two 
aspects: the idea that humans can master nature, including their own human nature, 
and that this can be done ‘rationally’. This turns the means into the end: rationality, 
or a rationally ordered society, becomes the goal rather than the most effective way 
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2.1 Modern	Rationality:	Operational	Symbolism	
According to Sybille Krämer (1988, 1991), modern rationality is computable 
rationality or reason (berechenbare	Vernunft). Computability is the ability to turn an 
argument into a Kalkül, a formal system. The algebraic formula is the archetype of 
such a computable form. 
In a formal system: 
a) The construction of symbols is decoupled from their interpretation. The allowed 
operations do not depend on what the symbols are supposed to mean in the end. 
b) Language becomes a technique (Technik); formal artificial languages, syntactic	
machines, can be constructed. 
c) Symbols become manipulable objects. 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716) developed a theory of symbols that can 
be used for ‘rational calculation’, calculus	ratiocinator: 
a) Symbols are objects that are manipulated according to rules. 
b) Symbols are autonomous with respect to what they signify; they become a formal 
system whose inner order is independent of the interpretation of the symbols; 
and the symbols appear in a new kind of script, typographic script, which is 
independent of spoken language. 
c) Formal systems (Kalkülisierung) and typographization turn symbols into 
mechanical production systems, symbolic	machines; artificial languages are a 
technology. 
d) Scientific thought produces knowledge (Erkenntnis); since knowledge 
production requires symbols, knowledge is the product of the operation of 
symbolic machines. 
e) As a consequence, the objects of knowledge (Gegenstände	 der	 Erkenntnis) 
themselves are also generated by symbolic machines. 
The term symbolism denotes the theory of what and how symbols signify, how they 
get their meaning. If the signification is the product of some operation according to 
some rules, we can call this theory of signification operational	symbolism. 
If one generalizes the concept of symbolic machines to language as a whole, we 
roughly get Wittgenstein’s concept of language games in his Philosophical	
Investigations; that is, the meaning of words depends on how they are used according 
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to more or less formally defined rules (Ros 1989; Tugendhat 1982; Wittgenstein 
1958). 
2.2 Predecessors	 to	 Operational	 Symbolism:	 Ontological	 and	 Magical	
Symbolism	
It is useful to contrast operational symbolism with its predecessors in the Western 
history of ideas, or philosophy. Only Western philosophy concerns us here: according 
to Castoriadis, capitalism is a product of Western civilization, and the autonomy 
project only emerged twice in human history, in ancient Athens and with modernity, 
and they did not emerge autochthonously anywhere else. But in today’s globalized 
world, everybody can participate, of course. 
The immediate predecessor of operational symbolism was ontological	symbolism, as 
conceived by Plato and Aristotle: the meaning of a symbol is an ideal object. The 
model of this symbolism is geometry: a triangle drawn in sand is murky and 
imperfect, but it represents or refers to the ideal triangle that the drawer means. By 
way of generalization, words (‘table’, ‘red’, ‘zero’, etc.) denote ideas that only 
somewhat fit the murky reality; reality is imperfect when compared with the ideal 
world of pure ideas. Since the ideas are thought to be located somewhere, questions 
arise about their ontological status, hence the term ontological	symbolism. 
Ontological symbolism has intrinsic problems, some of which were already identified 
by Plato himself. Where exactly can these ideas be found, and how do we access them? 
What is the reality of ideas about fictitious or impossible objects (unicorns, circular 
squares)? What is the reality of negative or non-existent objects (what does ‘0’ signify, 
and how is it possible that adding zeros, signifying nothing, at the end of a numeral 
increases the number signified?)? What is the idea of an idea (the idea not of a table, 
but of the idea	of	a	table), and does that not lead to an infinite regress? What about all 
the words in a sentence that do not have clear ideas behind them (particles, words 
like ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘this’ and ‘that’, articles like ‘a’ and ‘the’)? The logic of 
ontological symbolism, developed by Aristotle, only deals with subjects and 
predicates. 
Ontological symbolism itself was the solution to the intrinsic problems of its 
predecessor, magical	symbolism. Here the signification is thought of as a link from the 
symbol to what it represents within this world. For example, the name of a person is 
tied to its bearer, like a doll when used by a Voodoo priest. In a sense, in magical 
symbolism there is no difference between the symbol and the object it refers to: they 
are physically connected. But this direct-link hypothesis breaks down with abstract 
objects for which a direct link cannot be shown to exist. In ancient Greece, it was the 
Pythagoreans who discovered ‘symbolic difference’ (Krämer 1988) when they were 
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unable to a construct the square root of two by manipulating pebbles, their way of 
doing math. In a more general context, this type of symbolism operates with concrete 
prototypes; for example, in order to classify an object as a table, one compares it to 
some prototypical object that is known to be a table. The problem with a concrete 
prototype is that it has an infinite number of specific concrete properties, thus raising 
the question of why this particular object rather than some other is the prototype. 
The symbolic difference of ontological symbolism implies an ontological difference, 
ideal versus real world. 
Both transformations, the one from magical to ontological symbolism and the one 
from ontological to operational symbolism, took place in the context of the autonomy 
project—the first in the context of Athenian democracy, and the second in the context 
of the European Enlightenment. 
Magical symbolism requires experts (priests) to distinguish prototypes from other 
objects. In ontological symbolism, ideally everybody has equal access to ideas, 
although this may require training. This is why Plato required members of his 
Academy to study geometry, the model for ontological symbolism. 
Eventually, however, it became clear that the various problems with ontological 
symbolism could not be solved. Also eventually, Christian ideologues reintroduced 
the expertism of priests. According to Augustine, proper ideas could only be found in 
the minds of people who benefitted from the benevolence of God; that is, only 
Christians could have correct ideas. This is why he considered nonsensical the belief 
that it was possible to have serious discussions with heathens. 
2.3 Operational	Symbolism	and	Autonomy	
Operational symbolism does not suffer from an access problem: there is a symbolic 
difference, but no longer an ontological difference. Ideally, anybody can learn the 
state of the art in science and contribute to it by constructing their own symbolic 
machines. And there is no creative limit to what symbolic machines can be created. 
Older symbolisms were tied to the actual world; they were static. Operational 
symbolism is dynamic. 
Modern science is part of the autonomy project because 
a) it is ideally open for contribution by everyone who makes the required effort to 
learn the state of the art; 
b) its results are relevant for the possibilities of the formation of social order, 
i.e. what it is possible to achieve physically; and 
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c) modern rationality, the operation of symbolic machines, as such does not limit 
creativity (the explosion of modern mathematics is an example: any set of axioms 
is effectively such a machine). 
2.4 Two	Modes	of	Rational	Mastery:	Capital	and	Bureaucracy	
Modern rationality becomes the antithesis to autonomy when it becomes an end in 
itself and enters the hubris of unlimited mastery—that is, when the social order 
should be the implementation of some kind of imagined rationality, or rational order. 
A good example of the antagonism between autonomy and rational mastery can be 
found in modern utopian literature, which starts with Thomas More. Typically, the 
author presents a society that is the conscious creation of its citizens, hence an 
autonomous society. But at the same time the order represents the author’s idea of 
how an ideal society should be designed based on allegedly rational principles. 
The self-referential application of rationality as an end in itself plus hubris is the 
‘mastery’ aspect of rational mastery. We propose that there are two modes of rational 
mastery: 
a) The extension of property and its monetary quantification, or capitalization; and 
b) Procedural rationality institutionalized as bureaucracy: an organization’s 
rational goals are calculated and implemented using formal procedures by a 
hierarchical organization that is created according to allegedly rational 
principles. 
The two modes exist side by side—indeed, capitalizing organizations 
like corporations are typically internally organized as bureaucratic hierarchies—and 
there are feedback mechanisms between the two modes (see sec. 5). 
Rational mastery is actually pseudorational pseudomastery: it is not rational and it 
fails because of its own operations. As we will see, it is also autocatalytic: the process 
of increasing rational mastery yields its own growth. 
3 Property,	Credit,	Money	
Capitalization is defined as 𝐾 ൌ 𝑎𝐸, where 𝐾 is capitalization in monetary units, 𝐸 is 
expected or past earnings in monetary units and 𝑎 is the product of accumulation 
factors, which are pure numbers (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). Currently, the Capital as 
Power theory distinguishes the accumulation factors hype, inverted risk, and the 
reciprocal average rate of return. We note that by virtue of the fact that capitalization 
is an algebraic formula, capitalization is a symbolic machine in Krämer’s sense. 
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Capitalists generate knowledge through capitalization. Just as a hologram contains all 
the information necessary to reproduce a given object, 𝐾 conceptually contains the 
observations of how a capitalist sees all of society (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). At the 
same time, 𝐾 is wealth, Kapitalvermögen, financial might. Thus capitalization is both 
an ‘engine’ and a ‘camera’ (MacKenzie 2008). Earnings may be expected future 
earnings, but in times of systemic fear they become past earnings (Bichler and Nitzan 
2018). Just as formulae in science are inventions of scientists that are tested by 
empirical observation, which are themselves another set of formulae, capitalization 
is an operation done by business to test whether events work out as expected or not. 
At the same time an investment operation is an engine, an action to create formations 
such that the expected outcome in the form of earnings shall happen. 
Capitalization is an act of quantification in monetary units (Geldeinheiten). The object 
of quantification are the owner’s assets, their Vermögen, the result is their financial 
assets, their Geldvermögen. Thus, we need to understand how money, Geld, and 
property, Eigentum, are linked together to yield capital, Kapitalvermögen. In the next 
subsections, I sketch the property theory of money as developed by Gunnar Heinsohn, 
Otto Steiger, and Hans-Joachim Stadermann (Heinsohn and Steiger 2009; 
Stadermann 2006; Steiger and Stadermann 2001; related also Graeber 2014) in the 
context of Capital as Power. The property theory of money is not only the best 
conceptualization of money in economics, it also provides the most obvious fit to 
Bichler and Nitzan’s conceptualization of capital as power. 
3.1 Property	
‘Ownership is the right to enjoy (use) and dispose of things in the most absolute 
manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations’ 
(Code Napoléon Art. 544, Legifrance 2018). This is the legal definition of ownership. 
German law is even more explicit: ‘Das Eigentumsrecht ist ein umfassendes 
Herrschaftsrecht’ (‘Property is a comprehensive right of domination or rule’) 
(Friedrich-Schmidt 2019; Schlüter 2014). 
Observations: 
a) The definition of ownership in the Napoleonic Code is the prototype of 
bourgeois, and hence capitalist, property law, although the definition goes back 
to the Romans. 
b) This definition distinguishes two distinct rights: the right to use (‘enjoy’) the 
things owned, and the right to dispose of them. 
c) Owners may dispose of things as follows: they may commodify them, i.e. sell them 
against payment, after which they are, of course, no longer owned; they may rent 
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them for a fee, in which case someone else enjoys them; and they may 
collateralize them in a credit contract, possibly in addition to renting or using 
them. Collateralization is independent from who uses the things in question. 
d) The right to generate earnings from things is included in the right to dispose of 
those things. 
e) Ownership rights may be exercised ‘in the most absolute manner’. In feudalism, 
property rights were always particular rights, restricted by tradition, religion, 
customs and so on. Any use beyond those restrictions could nullify the 
ownership right. 
f) Restrictions must be explicitly stated in laws made by the state. But the 
bourgeois state itself is a creation of the very property owners who subjugate 
themselves to its law. Hence fights over restrictions, whether to impose them or 
not, become part and parcel of business operations, and thus of differential 
accumulation. 
3.2 Money	Creation	Through	Credit	
Modern capitalism originated in the city states of late Medieval and Renaissance 
Europe in the form of business transacted by merchants who formed networks of 
consenting owners, often consisting of very few families, that extended across 
European cities and courts. Within these networks, business could be done via debt 
records, tallies, clearings, and negotiable instruments (the money of the merchants), 
which was safer than transferring actual valuables like silver coins, which could be 
stolen and needed to be handled and transported. In order to be eligible as a debtor, 
a merchant needed property as collateral. Certificates collateralized by property 
could circulate as money. We can distinguish debtor’s money and creditor’s money. 
Suppose we have an owner of an ‘interesting’ object, say a silver mine. The owner 
would like to exploit the mine, to ‘enjoy’ digging out the silver in it, so to say. To do so, 
equipment and miners, which may come from faraway places, are necessary. Suppose 
the owner has no money or other valuable goods to pay for these things. What should 
they do? They could issue notes backed by the silver to be dug out. This way, the mine 
owner becomes a debtor who issues notes backed by their property. This is debtor’s	
money. 
Suppose that the mine owner is relatively unknown outside their neighborhood. In 
this case, they have problems getting their notes accepted outside that neighborhood. 
Now suppose that there is a rich, well-known merchant house in the neighborhood 
with many branches outside the neighborhood. The mine owner can go to the 
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merchant house and ask it to supply notes promising its bearer to pay a certain 
amount of property, a promise backed by the merchant house’s property, assuming 
that such notes would be accepted thanks to the reputation of the merchant house. 
The mine owner needs to promise to pay back the value of the bills, for example in 
the form of the silver dug out. In return, the merchant house asks for (a) some extra 
payment, interest, and (b) some property (e.g. the mine) as collateral or security, 
should the mine owner fail to pay. In this case, the merchant house is the creditor of 
the mine owner, and the bills issued are creditor’s	money. It is this type of creditor’s 
money that got the early banking houses in Italy started in the fourteenth century. 
Let us note several points: 
a) The obligation of the debtor who receives the bills from the bank and the amount 
on the bills are nominal	units. If the bill promises to its holder ‘one florin’, any 
items agreed to be worth this amount may be sufficient for payment. 
b) Both the debtor and the creditor are owners of property. In early banking—
indeed, until almost the twentieth century—non-owners were not creditworthy. 
Importantly, the whole point of the operation is that both parties remain owners 
of their respective property. They dispose of their property in such a way that 
they both remain in possession of it and can dispose of it. 
c) There is a risk of default, the danger that the debtor will not be able to pay back 
their debt, which is bad luck for the creditor, especially if the debtor’s collateral 
turns out not to be worth the amount credited. Typically, the creditor may ask 
for different collateral or change the credit arrangement. The latter was 
particularly the case with credit issued to sovereigns. The Bank of England was 
effectively created when, after a lost war with France, the creditors to the Crown 
demanded other means of being repaid. Thus were born eternal state credit, 
taxation, and the English lottery. 
d) It is also possible that the receivers of the merchant’s bills immediately turn to 
the merchant and demand to be paid. The art of banking consists of this not 
happening: if the bank is very trustworthy, it may be much more useful for the 
owner of its bills to use the bills for their own business as a means of payment. 
Once this procedure is institutionalized, bank notes can become legal tender. 
e) The possibility that note holders will ask to be paid, however, created the need 
for the bank to hold enough of its own property to fulfill such a demand. Hence a 
certain fraction of the bank’s property is locked to secure the bills issued. 
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f) Interest is charged because otherwise the owner, for example the merchant or 
bank, would simply not be interested in giving credit. Interest is a premium for 
the collateralization of property, hence a ‘property premium’ (Heinsohn and 
Steiger 2009). As a consequence, there is no property-based money without 
interest. A risk premium may, of course, also be charged to make up for a lack of 
information about the debtor, their collateral or general circumstances, which 
are always mostly unknown—the ‘fog of business’, one could call it, paraphrasing 
Clausewitz (1943)—or for the risk of holders of the bills asking for their promise. 
g) There is the story that English goldsmiths were some of the first bankers to use 
their customers’ gold deposits as collateral for issuing bank notes. According to 
Heinsohn and Steiger, the true story is a bit different. Those banks were set up 
by wealthy owners who offered their own property as collateral for the banking 
operation. They were not mere customers, a version of the story that only 
emerged in the nineteenth century, when the capitalization process drew 
ordinary people into the process. 
h) What happens if a holder of a note offers it to the issuing bank? Instead of 
fulfilling the promise of payment, which threatens the property base, the bank 
may offer to record the sum in an account for that person and pay interest, i.e. a 
premium for non-fulfillment. And since there will be a promise for a larger 
amount at the end of the period, the bank can only prevent payment by 
promising the interest on the account for the original sum plus the interest 
promised so far, thus leading to the phenomenon of compound interest. 
3.3 Institutionalization	of	Money	Creation	
When the monetization of society became the rule, there was an increased threat that 
holders of bank notes would demand payment of the promise and thus ruin the bank, 
as frequently occurred, for example, in the US during the free banking era and into 
the twentieth century. Thus, the money-issuing institution eventually needed to be 
shielded from direct contact with society at large. The crediting operation was 
separated from money creation: a reserve system was created in which a central bank 
took over the money supply to commercial banks, which continued to do the ordinary 
credit operations. But the money supply itself remained a credit operation: 
commercial banks received money from the central bank against assets deposited, 
and they passed this money on to customers. In this way, commercial banks could 
become modern corporations and hence part of the game of differential 
accumulation. 
Debtors’ obligations were made transferable, which turned them into commodities in 
the form of bonds. With the emergence of public banks, states would take credit from 
 14 
 
THE AUTOCATALYTIC SPRAWL OF PSEUDORATIONAL MASTERY 
them against bonds whose interest would be paid with money, issued by the same 
banks, raised from taxes (Van Dillen 1934). The state thereby enforced payment in 
the money issued by the law. If a taxpayer did not pay, the state would enforce its 
demand by seizing some property. This way, the entire property base of the state, and 
subsequently capitalist society, became the collateral for the money issued by central 
banks. 
3.4 Credit	Paper	as	Higher‐Order	Property	
Owners of bonds treat them as normal assets, i.e. as part of their Vermögen. The 
interest payments are the Vermögen’s earnings. Parts of the Vermögen may be 
disposed of as collateral in a credit operation. Until recently, when commercial banks 
demanded money from the central bank, they usually handed in sovereign bonds, or 
at least promised them as collateral. 
Bonds and other such transferable credit papers specify a right to the receipt of 
interest. This is earnings from an item owned, the operational definition of property. 
Thus, a credit paper, while actually based on property by collateralization, itself 
becomes property. As such, it may itself be used as collateral for a credit operation. In 
particular, bonds issued by states are generally thought of as the best possible 
collateral, if those states 
a) have an extensive property base, where the citizens are owners, the society is 
thoroughly capitalized, and there is a legal system that supports and defends 
private ownership; 
b) enforce taxation against all that property; and 
c) have a fiscal policy with a low risk of state default. 
Money, the means of payment, emerges out of credit operations backed by a society’s 
property base. But the transferable credit papers themselves become part of the 
property base, which may be used for further credit operations. Second-order 
property, so to say. And these further operations in turn may be used the same way, 
thus generating third-order property and so on. 
3.5 Credit	Operation	and	Risk	Creation	
The fact that money is created only if there is a property backup and an interest 
payment in money means that, in aggregate, the money available in a society is 
necessarily insufficient to pay off all debt plus interest. This means that there must be 
some debtors who find it difficult to raise the necessary money through the business 
operation underlying their credit contract. They need to be inventive. But this 
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changes the social and physical formation from what it was when the credit was 
contracted: the assumptions underlying the contract change. This change creates a 
particular kind of risk—a risk that is generated by the credit operation itself. 
In order to manage the risk that their debtors may default, creditors may buy 
insurance: some other party may, against a small constant fee, offer a paper whose 
issuer promises to make the payment if the debtor defaults. Another way of trying to 
overcome the risky ever-changing world is to fix prices in the future—with futures 
contracts, for example—and thus to assume away the possibility that the world will 
change between now and when the payment is due. 
Thus we enter the world of financial derivatives. What makes derivatives derivatives 
is that they 
a) are based on some underlying contract, which may itself already be a derivative; 
b) specify a right to earnings, sometimes conditional on some externality; and 
hence 
c) are yet another form of property that can be disposed of—sold or otherwise 
transferred—or used as collateral in other credit operations. 
3.6 The	Autocatalytic	Sprawl	of	Credit	and	Accumulation	
So, the products of credit operations themselves are the foundation of further credit 
operations. Further credit operations are necessary because of the interest, without 
which there would be no credit operations. But interest creates the need for more 
money than is available. Because money is a credit-based entity, the demand for more 
money necessitates the extension of the credit system. Also, all credit operations 
create risk. And the risk is managed through further credit operations. All together, 
we have a process whose product is the generator of its own processing. 
‘A single chemical reaction is said to be autocatalytic if one of the reaction products is 
also a catalyst for the same or a coupled reaction.’ (Wikipedia 2018). If we carry this 
definition over to the social symbolic machinery, we can say that credit creation is an 
autocatalytic process, a process that feeds itself. 
Business is conducted to differentially accumulate capital. Credit is the symbolic 
machinery of business operations. Money is the means of payment of these 
operations. Money itself is also a product of credit operations. Underlying all credit 
operations is the property system, the comprehensive right of domination, or just 
power, over the things owned. Capital is power, that is, the ability to create social 
formations (gesellschaftliches Gestaltungsvermögen) to increase that ability. These 
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intended formations are the social order business tries to achieve, the ‘creorder’ as 
Nitzan and Bichler (2009) call it. 
But the autocatalytic processing of credit operations has no predetermined direction 
and appears to be rather chaotic. Further operations originate from existing ones, so 
the process is a sprawl, like the urban sprawl radiating from town centers. The result 
of business operations, the autocatalytic sprawl of the financial system, is itself a 
social formation, but it is not the order business intends to achieve. Instead, the 
autocatalytic sprawl of finance is the unintended result of business operations. The 
overall social formation (gesellschaftliche Gestalt) of the capitalist society is thus not 
‘creorder’, but a mixture of order and chaos that business continuously needs to deal 
with. 
We note that the processes of credit creation and differential accumulation are 
operationally closed: in order to counter a problem created by these operations, other 
operations with the same logic are performed without ever leaving the conceptual 
framework of capital accumulation. 
4 Bureaucracy	
Blair Fix (2018) discusses how a position in a hierarchy can be translated into income: 
basically, income grows exponentially with position in a hierarchy. Bichler and Nitzan 
(2017) observe that hierarchical organization is always a power institution, and not 
just an organizational convenience. Fix thus shows one kind of interaction of 
bureaucratic power and capital power. In the following, I theorize that bureaucracy 
is hierarchical	 organization	 plus	 operational	 symbolism and is the other mode of 
rational mastery, alongside capitalization. 
4.1 Bureaucratic	Capitalism	
Max Weber (2013) offered the now standard definition: a bureaucracy is a 
hierarchically ordered organization in which a higher level commands the level 
directly below by setting up generalized formal procedures and courses of action 
whose results are assessed by the same or other bureaucratic organizations. Each 
level is organized in departments with defined competences. Not only are almost all 
state organizations organized according to these principles, but so too are bigger 
corporations. 
Theories of bureaucratic capitalism flourished in the 1950s and 1960s. Castoriadis 
and the Socialisme	ou	Barbarie group developed theories of this type (Amair et al. 
2017). They are no longer much focused on in political theory despite the persistent 
complaints about bureaucratization (Graeber 2016). 
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4.2 The	Phases	of	Global	Capitalization	
According to Nitzan and Bichler (2009), the capitalization of human societies 
occurred in phases . During each phase, the accumulation process would eventually 
hit an organizational barrier, or ‘envelope’. Through radical organizational re-
formation (Umgestaltung), capitalism was able to break these envelopes and proceed 
further until the process hit the next barrier: 
a) the monopoly	 wave of the turn of the twentieth century occurred within 
individual industries; 
b) the oligopoly	wave of the 1920s occurred within sectors; 
c) the conglomerate	wave of the 1960s took place across the entire business sector 
at the national level; and 
d) the ongoing globalization	wave started in the 1970s and breaks the national 
envelope. 
The first three waves took place within the legal and political framework of the 
nation-state, the first two including colonies. These nation-states saw an ever 
increasing bureaucratization of their organization. In the late 1960s, when theories 
of bureaucratic capitalism flourished, the situation in Western states looked roughly 
like this: many big corporations were either, on the one hand, directly socialized 
(e.g. the automotive industry in France) or operated like state institutions (Pan Am, a 
private business, acted as the US’s national carrier). Either way, there were tight 
arrangements between the state, business and trade unions. Many services, such as 
electricity, postal services and telecommunications, had been made public in the mid-
nineteenth century and were therefore not the direct target of the accumulation 
process. The planification, the French five-year plans of such public corporations, was 
similar to the five-year plans of the Soviet bloc. And then there was the Eastern Bloc 
of party-bureaucratic regimes like the Soviet Empire and China. So we can say that 
the organizational mode of pretty much the entire world, whether capitalist or 
communist, was bureaucratic, and thus theories of bureaucratic capitalism seemed 
right. 
It turned out, however, that the differential-accumulation process did not cease with 
global bureaucratization. On the contrary, transnational capitalism, which broke the 
national envelope beginning from the 1970s on, created new institutional formations, 
and it became apparent that the differential-accumulation process never went away. 
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the transformation of China may be understood as 
a (re)capitalization of their party-bureaucratic regimes, either by transforming them 
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directly into Western-style capitalist regimes, as in the case of Eastern Europe, or 
through the capitalization of the state bureaucracy by the bureaucrats themselves, as 
in Russia and especially China, where top party bureaucrats are simultaneously the 
top businesspeople. 
Corporations and nation-states are internally organized in a hierarchical fashion 
based on systems of rules; that is, they are internally/organizationally bureaucratic 
regimes. The environment of these bureaucratic regimes, however, is differentially 
accumulating capitalism. The survival of bureaucratic organizations, whether states 
or corporations, depends on their successful differential accumulation. 
4.3 The	Autocatalytic	Sprawl	of	Bureaucratic	Organization	
In the idealized Weberian world, bureaucratic rules are rational, set up by 
disinterested persons or organizations and executed as written. In reality, everybody 
involved is interested in making a career and not working too much. Bureaucratic 
institutions are pervaded with power struggles: managers of lower levels in the 
hierarchy try to rise to higher levels, and hence make informal arrangements, engage 
in mobbing and withhold information. Subordinates try to do the same or resist, or 
they try to stay out of the game altogether. In any case, all these activities are 
motivated by goals that are irrational from a higher perspective and are not a 
conceptual part of bureaucratic schemes. 
For a bureaucracy to function, those who set up the rules require information about 
the processes involved. But those affected will hold back information if it is in their 
interest to do so—because, for example, information is power or too much 
information at higher levels of the organization threatens them with a heavier 
workload or unwanted regulations. Bureaucratic rules are thus made without the 
necessary information and are thus inadequate for their purpose. This feeds the 
irrationalities of the system back into the system itself and increases them further. 
Management sets goals for subordinates. Management also sets the rules under which 
subordinates are required to work. But the inadequacy of the rules forces those who 
have to execute them to continuously work against them to achieve the intended 
goals. But working against the rules shows disloyalty to the management. So there is 
a double bind: either the rules must be broken or the goals will not be met. This inner 
contradiction further undermines the alleged rationality of the bureaucratic regime. 
Occasionally, management discovers the irrationalities of the bureaucratic order. The 
solution is the creation of new bodies for inquiries and surveillance. Since these 
bodies are necessarily also bureaucratic organizations, in that they have goals and 
rationally conceived rules, these attempts do no more than further increase the 
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dysfunctionality of the system. In the US, after 9/11 it was discovered that the 13 
Secret Service agencies did not cooperate properly, so another 14th agency was 
created to coordinate them all. In the German Democratic Republic, the ruling party 
had to create an entire bureaucratic ‘state security’, the Stasi, whose mission was to 
investigate what people really thought to make up for the planning bureaucrats’ lack 
of information about the goings-on in society. The Stasi’s task was not made easier by 
its additional and contradictory goal to supress any resistance against the regime—
with criticism being one sign for such resistance. 
We have observed that capitalization is operationally closed: if problems occur as a 
result of its own logic, the solution is more capitalization. Similarly, if a problem 
occurs in a bureaucratic regime, the bureaucracy creates new bureaucratic rules or 
organizations to manage it. Thus, the bureaucratic logic is also operationally closed: 
bureaucracies create new bureaucracies. Furthermore, the irrationalities of 
bureaucracy create the need for new bureaucracies. Like finance, bureaucratic 
regimes sprawl autocatalytically: they grow indefinitely by way of their own 
processing in a seemingly chaotic way. 
5 The	Interaction	Between	Bureaucracy	and	Capitalization	
5.1 Rationality,	Hierarchy,	Regulation	
The intrinsic irrationalities of bureaucratic institutions are confined to some extent 
by the need for survival in differentially accumulating capitalism. So the internal 
rationality of a bureaucratic organization is a function of the external rationality of 
differential capital accumulation. 
But we have already seen that the autocatalytic sprawl of finance is a result of its inner 
contradictions, which already turns its rationality into pseudorationality. 
Furthermore, capitalization is the implementation of power struggles via the 
syntactic machine of capitalization. In order to defend financial capitalism as rational, 
power struggles also have to be defended as rational. The usual way to do this seems 
to be to say that power struggles are an inherent part of human nature. So the 
capitalist world is, as Marx noted, a kind of second nature, a social formation modeled 
on the jungle as an adequate habitat for human beings. Unfortunately, such an 
argument ignores the fact that in addition to fighting each other all the time, people 
cooperate all the time too. Indeed, if, within a business corporation, everybody acted 
towards each other as capitalists—with the secretary only giving out paper against 
payment, for example—the corporation would immediately break down. 
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At any level in a hierarchy, information is power, and is thus, if possible, not made 
available to higher or lower levels, which undermines the rationality of the 
bureaucratic process. Contracts are signed with the limited information the 
contracting sides have about the situation they are in. Thus, intelligence, the 
collection of information relevant to the power struggle, is a primary concern in both 
bureaucracy and capitalization. Research is needed to confirm this point, but this 
might explain the enormous growth of the information sector in general and 
computing technologies in particular, considering that this growth has occurred 
specifically in the context of modern rationality. 
Fix (2018) demonstrates that greater bureaucratic hierarchy is related to increasing 
incomes. This is already a capitalization of bureaucratic power. By way of extension, 
we could say that the ultimate transformation of bureaucratic power into capital 
power takes place when those at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy of a 
corporation, the managers, use the wealth or might (Vermögen) they have earned 
through salaries and stock options to perform a management buyout to become the 
owners of the business. 
It would be interesting to investigate the relationship between firm size in terms of 
number of employees, firm size in terms of capitalization and the number of 
hierarchical levels. Also, how has the size distribution of firms developed over time? 
Is there a trend towards bigger and bigger firms or not? One would think that 
bureaucratic hierarchies might grow too big, and that their inner contradictions 
would eventually work against their success in differential accumulation, so there 
should be a movement back and forth from mergers and acquisitions to outsourcing. 
It would also be interesting to know if internal breadth (mergers and acquisitions) 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009) is the preferred mode of differential accumulation not only 
because it is the path of least resistance, but also because it allows direct bureaucratic 
control of the acquired organization. 
Occasionally, the idea comes up that the irrationalities of financial capitalism should 
be regulated, through either new laws and prescriptions or socialization. But this of 
course would just create new bureaucratic institutions. Proposals in the opposite 
direction—that the irrationalities of state bureaucracy may be lessened by 
privatization, for example by splitting up a larger state institutions and selling them 
on the market as new business enterprises—also exist, and they were especially 
popular between the 1980s and 2000s. Apart from the fact that the inner regime of 
these new businesses remains bureaucratic, they are now directly subject to the 
irrationalities of differential accumulation. In addition, privatization frequently 
creates the need for regulation of the new business field. The picture we get is of a 
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kind of ping-pong game between the two forms of ever-growing pseudorational 
pseudomastery over social organization. 
The capital and bureaucratic modes of pseudorational mastery are believed to be able 
to overcome their operational closedness by jumping over to the other mode, only to 
run into that mode’s irrationalities. Rational mastery, with its two modes of 
capitalization and bureaucracy, is an endless agony that generates more of itself. 
Hence the autocatalytic	sprawl	of	pseudorational	pseudomastery. 
5.2 Systemic	Crisis…	
Bichler and Nitzan (2018) advance a theory of systemic crisis, which may be 
summarized thus. Capitalization is the discounting of expected future income. There 
are times when income trails its expectations by years. There are other times when 
actual income matches expectations at nearly the same time. Let us call the lag 
temporal	expectation	horizon or just expectation	horizon (my terms). A shrinking of 
the expectation horizon to near zero destroys the machinery of capitalization because 
there is no longer a foreseeable future. This indicates a systemic crisis. Bichler and 
Nitzan perform an aggregate analysis to make their claims—while normally arguing 
against aggregate analysis. 
Before we investigate the notion of systemic in light of Castoriadis’ SIS, which Bichler 
and Nitzan do not use, let us see if a shrinking time horizon is necessarily a sign of a 
systemic crisis. As a thought experiment, assume that at a given time a particular 
capitalist regime consists of two core capitals, A and B. Assume A is old and very big, 
while B is new and small. The aggregate capitalization of A and B will be dominated 
by A. Now suppose investors lose faith in the future of A-type businesses, perhaps 
because their profit margins are shrinking rapidly, while B-type businesses are hyped 
as the new big thing and have high profit rates. In such a case, the expectation horizon 
of A will shrink to zero, while that of B may still be several years. In the aggregate, 
because of the still-dominant A, it will look like all of capitalism is in a crisis, i.e. that 
there is a systemic crisis, whereas a disaggregate analysis would show that a change 
in dominant capital is underway. Thus, an aggregate expectation horizon is not a 
sufficient criterion for systemic crisis. 
The Capital as Power theory is intended to understand the course of events within a 
capitalist society. Can such a theory capture a state beyond capitalism—or, in other 
words, a truly systemic crisis? 
5.3 …	Or	Autocatalytic	Agony?	
If we, in accord with Castoriadis, theorize capitalism with the conceptual framework 
of the double SIS of modernity, the autonomy project versus rational mastery, the 
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autonomy project has been in decline since the 1950s, as evidenced by a ‘rising tide 
of insignificancy’ and a ‘world in fragments’. The movements of the late 1960s were 
only the last reappearance of the autonomy project (Castoriadis 1997c, 2003c). The 
world is increasingly governed by the SIS of rational mastery, the autocatalytic sprawl 
of bureaucracy. To the latter we can add the equally autocatalytic growth of 
capitalization. But there is a problem for the process of ever-increasing rational 
mastery. Throughout its history, rational mastery has always been challenged by the 
autonomy project, and the dynamics of the Western ‘socio-historic’, as Castoriadis 
calls it, have always been driven by the antinomy between autonomy and rational 
mastery. But with the autonomy SIS withering away, the control project loses its 
direction, so to say. 
There may be another fundamental problem for the continuation of capitalist 
accumulation. The transnationalization of the capital-accumulation process means 
that its institutional foundation within the nation-state may no longer be adequate 
for the process to continue. A new transnational state may be necessary. 
Furthermore, the nation-state obtained its legitimacy from the imaginary of the 
nation, or nationalism. Nations are ‘imagined communities’, to take up Benedict 
Anderson’s (2006) notion: a member of a nation, a citizen, can lead a meaningful life 
if they support their nation: ‘My country, right or wrong’. Nationalism, as an SIS, 
emerged in the seventeenth century and in the twentieth century proved stronger 
than other imaginaries, in particular the working-class movement, which can be 
understood as one branch of the autonomy project (Castoriadis 1993). As Pohrt 
(2012) observes, during the First World War workers went to what for many of them 
became their ‘last struggle’, not against capitalism, but against their coworkers in the 
opposite trenches, each in the name of their respective nation and for their respective 
capitalist elites. 
For transnational capitalism, an equally strong collective SIS that can act as a 
legitimacy generator does not exist. There have been attempts to create transnational 
imagined communities. Perhaps the most ambitious project of this type is, or was, the 
European Union. The European identity was supposed to eventually result in the 
creation of the United States of Europe. But the attempt to create a European 
constitution was voted down by the citizens of France, the Netherlands and Ireland, 
countries that were supposedly strong supporters of the European movement. And 
now we have Brexit and a zombieesque resurgence of nationalist parties and 
ideologies. Other attempts to build a system of transnational institutions are 
continuously marred by resistance and protests, including calls to national 
authorities to take back what has already been contracted out. There were protests 
against attempts to create transnational institutions, such as CETA and the TTIP; in 
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the 2010s we saw Occupy; before that, there was a series of G8 summit protests; in 
the 1990s, there was action against MAI. 
The transnationalization process necessarily undermines the organizational power 
of nation-states, i.e. state bureaucracies. The result is an increasing number of failed 
states as they are commonly called, a phenomenon that has started to reach the 
capitalist center (Greece, Mexico). We can define a failed	 state as a formerly 
bureaucratic entity that has become unable to survive the transnational-
accumulation process, and in which neither pseudorational bureaucracy nor finance 
rule, but anarchy and/or barbarism. There are even cases such as the new state of 
South Sudan, which got its independence in 2011 but went straight from there to an 
ongoing civil war. It went from national liberation to failed state without the 
intermediate formation of a functioning state bureaucracy. Without a legitimate 
bureaucratic organizational foundation, the transnationalization process may well 
undermine itself in the long run. 
The situation should perhaps be described as neither systemic nor a crisis. According 
to Castoriadis (2003b), crisis, in the Hippocratic sense, means that a situation 
develops towards a point of decision when the patient either dies or recovers. The 
present, however, looks more like a steady decay: with the SIS of autonomy long in 
decline, that of rational control may also be in decline due to its own success, but 
without a point of decision in sight. 
If neither autonomy nor rational mastery remain significant to people, some of them 
resort to nationalism or religion. But these SISs do not seem to be sustainable 
institution generators anymore either. Where religion and/or nationalism rule, we 
find corruption, gangsterism or outright barbarism—the Syrian Civil War being the 
obvious current example where all conflict parties engage in these kind of activities. 
All in all, we might well be in a situation in which all imaginary significations that once 
generated social formations are in decline, not just the SIS of autonomy, but also that 
of rational mastery. But such a decline would be outside the conceptual reach of a 
theory that is designed to analyze the generative processes of a particular SIS, such as 
Capital as Power is for the financial part of rational mastery. 
6 Way	Out?	Autonomy	and	Operational	Symbolism	
Is there a way out of the mess of the autocatalytic sprawl of pseudorational 
pseudomastery? 
I have argued that operational symbolism is unavoidable in that previous symbolisms 
failed. In addition, modern science, properly understood, is part of the SIS of 
 24 
 
THE AUTOCATALYTIC SPRAWL OF PSEUDORATIONAL MASTERY 
autonomy: it is the rejection of authority, God, holy books and tradition when it comes 
to the question of what is actually the case. Instead, it advances human knowledge 
through empirical investigation and critique. According to Krämer modern sciences 
advances by the construction of symbolic machines within the context of operational 
symbolism. We have seen that the only limit to the construction such machines is 
human creativity, as the vast expansion of modern math shows. In this sense, 
operational symbolism provides unparalleled liberty in terms of what can be 
imagined. Modern science not only offers liberation, it is also necessary. There will 
soon be 10 billion people on Earth who need food and housing, which cannot possibly 
be provided without the application of science-based technology. 
Since modern rationality when combined with mastery yields autocatalytic agony, the 
solution may lie in a new attempt at autonomy that does not reject the power of 
modern science: rational autonomy. In sec. 1.4, we saw that all societies create their 
order (their nomos) themselves, and that the difference between heteronomy and 
autonomy is that in a heteronomous society, its members think that the nomos comes 
from somewhere else and is essentially unchangeable, whereas in an autonomous 
society its members consciously create their nomos. For a modern autonomous 
society to be truly democratic, all of its members must have the same right to 
participate in that creation. 
By these standards, no fully autonomous society has ever existed. Yet, according to 
Castoriadis, there have been two instances in human history when the imaginary of 
autonomy existed, the Athenian polis of antiquity, roughly from the eighth to the 
fourth centuries BC, and in modernity since the twelfth century AD. In Athens, it was 
limited by the fact that it excluded most of the population, in particular women, slaves 
and foreigners, and that it did not include all social spheres. Notably, the oikos, or 
private business, was not regulated by the polis. In modernity, these limitations no 
longer exist in principle, but instead it is the other imaginary of modernity, rational 
mastery, that limits and continuously cuts back the imaginary of autonomy to the 
point of making it almost vanish, the ‘rising tide of insignificancy’ (Castoriadis 2003c). 
6.1 Inspirations	from	the	Athenian	Polis	
According to Castoriadis (1991, 1997b, 2003a), the Athenians raised questions and 
found institutional solutions that may still be relevant for a revival of the autonomy 
project. Athens is not a model, but a source or germ. Here are some of those solutions: 
a) The selection of office holders by lot rather than through elections. Elections, the 
election of the ‘best’ (aristos) is an aristocratic institution. Selection by lot 
assumes total equality. 
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b) An extensive court system. Even decisions by the ecclesia, the assembly of the 
citizens, could be brought before the courts and ruled illegal. 
c) Institutions to warn against hubris, for example the Athenian theater. 
d) Measures to prevent private interests from influencing decisions about common 
matters. For example, in decisions about peace or war, citizens with property 
close to the city’s walls were excluded from participating. 
6.2 Inspirations	from	CERN	
Can we find organizations that can give us some inspiration in how to combine 
modern rationality (without mastery) and autonomy? I think a research machine like 
the particle accelerator CERN with its experiments (detectors) ATLAS, CMS and 
others may offer something here because it combines a relatively flat hierarchy and a 
democratic decision-making process with modern science, i.e. modern rationality 
(Grolle 2008; Knorr Cetina 1999). 
a) There are few hierarchical levels, and higher levels cannot give many orders to 
lower ones: the machine is so complex that only a few persons will understand 
any particular aspect of it, and thus no one else can command them. It is 
commonly assumed that a democracy proper must be simple enough that 
anybody can replace anybody. At CERN the opposite is true: they are equal 
because no one can replace anyone else, because no one understands in detail 
what anyone else does. 
b) There is no assignment of authorship. Any publication of any collaboration bears 
the names of all members, whether Nobel Prize winners or apprentices; the 
announcement of the ATLAS collaboration of the discovery of the Higgs boson 
lists all 2,932 members by name in alphabetical order (ATLAS Collaboration 
2012). The understanding is that the machine would not work without the 
contribution of each member, and that there is no way to tell which contribution 
is more important than any other. 
c) Experiments like the ATLAS detector are the most complex machines ever 
created. It should be possible, therefore, to find inspiration there to organize the 
creation and maintenance of any other technical system (railway system, 
aircraft, etc.) in a relatively power-free way, since these will likely be 
technologically simpler. The picture here would be a world in which all the 




THE AUTOCATALYTIC SPRAWL OF PSEUDORATIONAL MASTERY 
The idea is not to idealize CERN or any other organization we may find for inspiration. 
Bichler and Nitzan (2017) cite the US Tennessee Valley Authority. One could also 
mention the free software movement, in particular its more radical branches, which 
try to make the appropriation of their creations impossible via suitable license 
arrangements such as Copyleft (Free Software Foundation 2007) and are 
consequently less popular among businesses than more liberal projects and licenses. 
All of these examples operate in the context of the autocatalytic sprawl of 
pseudorational pseudomastery—capitalism and bureaucracy—and those involved in 
them were socialized in this context. So a more thorough investigation of this issue 
will have to deal with the problems such organizations face, and with whether these 
problems are intrinsic or the result of these projects being embedded in capitalism. 
In a collaboration people work together but otherwise live their private lives. Perhaps 
we will need to renew the utopias of a cooperative republic that flourished in France 
around 1900 (Draperi 2012), but now on a global scale. A global convivium or, to use 
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